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for their education and to share in inheritance of family property, the concubine rarely came with her Chinese mate when he returned to his native village.[43]

During the absence of the male head from his Chinese home, his wife usually acted as head of the household. She and her children were supported in great part by funds periodically remitted from abroad by the male head, and she had control of the dispersion of this and other family income derived from labor or property in the home village. The usual source of income at home was from agriculture.[44]

Although the economic status of emigrant families ranged from poor to wealthy, the overseas communities were on the whole wealthier than non-emigrant neighboring villages. The excess of the wealthier families' dual income was largely invested in land and houses.[45] When the Communists took over the area, they were faced with the problem of what attitude ought to be taken toward these landlord families whose income from abroad was a vital source of foreign exchange for the government.

Evidently, no special privileges or status

43. Ta Chen, Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change, ed. by Bruno Lasker, N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 140-43.

44. Ibid., pp. 58-85, 106-17.

45. Ibid., p. 110.

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to patrol the streets at night.

Other controls imposed by the security agencies and other government branches add to public discontent. Among these measures are the extensive rationing system and the frequent investigations conducted by public security agencies.

The Communists appear to be cognizant of such inconveniences which cause public dissatisfaction. In order to mitigate the situation, the Communists stress the importance of adopting a "mass line" policy. This means that the government orders its agencies to be mindful, insofar as possible, of public wishes when carrying out government policies. Communist cadres are instructed to report public feeling to the government. Propaganda agencies then attempt to "explain away" public complaints and to restore the public temper.

B. Tension within Organizations

Extreme control and centralization exercised by the Communist Party result in tension within all Party, state, and mass organizations.[37] By establishing various agencies of control, the Party has achieved centralization of power; however, these numerous control agencies often duplicate their functions. This leads to suspicion, tension, and a growing sense of wasted effort in the control agencies and in the organizations controlled by these agencies.

1. Tension within Government

Party control over the government is evident

37. For comparison with tension in Soviet Union, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Carryington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954.

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C. Food Rationing

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The amount of food on hand decreased[19] in the latter part of 1953, although the Communists claimed that the total production of grain was still slightly higher than that of 1952. In the process of grain-tax collection, tremendous losses occurred in transportation, especially in shipments by water, and in warehouse spoilage due to excessive moisture, fermentation, and improper handling. Confronted with the threat of a food shortage, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China introduced grain rationing on November 19, 1953, in a government order for the enforcement of "planned purchase and planned supply of food." Their motives were to secure the food required for the people's livelihood, to stabilize food prices, and to eliminate food profiteering. In accordance with the order, all trade in grains or other essential food items was, in effect, to be taken over by the government, which must fix the official purchasing price and the retail price and handle the entire food trade through a country-wide network.

Up to the end of January 1954, the planned supply of food was reported to have been enforced in 13 municipalities, including Wuhan, Canton, Chengchow, and Kweilin of the Central-

19. NCNA, Feb. 28, 1954.

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South Region, in 156 medium cities, 11 hsien cities, and in other important towns, with a total population of 60 million.[20] In May 1954 there were 1,448 grain markets established in Honan Province alone and in other provinces of Central-South China an even greater number of grain markets had been established.[21] It was reported that from January 1, 1954, adults in Kwangtung were allotted 1/2 catty (11/20 pound) of rice per day and children under seven 1/4 catty (0.275 pound) per day. Rationing of cooking oil was regulated for adults at 3/4 catty (33/40 pound), and for children under seven, 3/8 catty (33/80 pound) per month.[22] The amount was lowered from March 1 of the same year to 7/16 catty (77/100 pound) per capita per month for adults, but the rationing has not been carried out with any great regularity.

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20. New China News Agency, Peking, Feb. 28, 1954. According to incomplete statistics, 8.27 million members of the CCP conducted extensive propaganda among the peasants in the provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Liaoning, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi.

21. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVII, No. 2, July 8, 1954, pp. 37-38.

22. Free Asia Bulletin, telegraph report from Hong Kong, January 7, 1954. Rationing of edible oil was also enforced in November 1954 through a separate governmental order.

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Communists said the workers became more ambitious and wished to improve their technical knowledge in order to earn more pay.

The Communists told the workers that it was to their advantage to produce more in order that all of the people could share the increase. But according to Communist statistics for 13 major enterprises in Central-South China, the value of production increased 88 per cent in 1951 in comparison with that of 1950, while wages increased only 13.29 per cent in the corresponding period.[24] Increase in wages was far behind the increase in production.

After the reform of the wage system in 1952, the wage level in Central-South China increased 15 per cent in comparison with that of 1951. The average number of wage units each worker earned per month was raised from 190.02 in 1951 to 218.52 in 1952. One unit[25] was quoted at 2,168 yuan (old currency) in September 1952. The average basic money wage for each worker per month grossed 473,751 yuan (about US$ 20.10).[26]

According to the Communists, the increase of wages in China today is not the result of an effort to keep pace with the rise of commodity prices but represents a real increase in the workers' living standard. They reported that in Central-South

24. Ibid., p. 5.
25. Yangtze Daily, Sept. 1952, p. 2.
26. One U. S. $ was quoted as 20,040 yuan in Canton Daily, Sept. 2, 1952, p. 4.

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the people's purchasing power had increased 30 per cent[27] in 1952 in comparison with that of 1950. In the spring of 1953 the sales of commodities such as cotton underwear, woolen cloth, socks, toothpaste, rubber shoes, and thermos flasks in the State department store in Wuhan were one to four times more[28] than those in the spring of 1952.

Besides the basic wages, the workers earn additional income through piece-rate payments, bonuses, and participation in production contests. On the other hand, gross income is subject to various deductions in union fees, "voluntary" contributions, and purchase of government bonds. The last item is a kind of compulsory savings imposed upon the workers by the government to prevent inflation and to cover up the fact of undersupply of consumers' goods in Communist China. When the Chinese People's Government issued Victory Bonds in 1950, 30,000 points[29] were allocated to Central-South China. Party members and cadres of trade unions advised workers to buy bonds. The floating of National Reconstruction Bonds in 1954 again absorbed one portion of the increase in wages. Accordingly, Communist reports of the rise of the living standard of the Chinese working class are open to suspicion.

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27. Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin], Hong Kong, Feb. 24, 1953, p. 10.

28. Ibid., Sept. 8, 1953, p. 5.

29. Cf. Workers' Daily, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1. One point represents the total value of 6 catties of rice, 1 catty of flour, 4 ch'ih of cotton cloth, and 16 catties of coal. (One catty = 1.1 lb., one ch'ih = 1.09 feet.)